
Citizen and/or Religionist

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The terms 'citizen' and 'religionist' suggest different worlds, in terms of values, in terms of expectations, and in terms of applications of those values and expectations to life. The one suggests this world; the other suggest this world and perhaps the next. The world of the citizen and the world of the religionist come into contact and into conflict because some persons may identify with one and some with the other and some with both. In some settings, individuals may identify with neither. As we use 'citizen' in this paper, we mean a person who finds his/her identity within a particular physical and geographical setting and whose behavior is shaped by expectations incumbent and equal upon all others in that setting. Those expectations are reinforced by sanctions in this life, as applied by a government, *i.e.*, by some organized legal structure.

By 'religionist,' we mean a person who finds his/her identity within a particular group which may be in a number of physical and geographical settings and whose behavior is shaped by expectations incumbent on all others in that group. Those expectations are shaped by the belief that they are divinely derived and may be reinforced by sanctions in this life and in the life to come; the sanctions in this life would be applied by a human group or would be applied, it is believed, by God in the life to come.

'Citizen' and 'religionist' reflect aspects of the ancient and modern world, though in the ancient world, 'citizen' in the even broader sense of someone with guaranteed rights was found in few places and in the modern world that broader sense took a long time to develop. 'Religionist' in the ancient world in some places meant a person whose behavior might be shaped by this worldly sanctions; the mark of 'religionist' in the modern world has been to remove those worldly sanctions.

For some, being a citizen meant being set in a larger arena than being a religionist because in some societies, ancient and modern, there could or can be one kind of citizen, but many kinds of religionists. For others, being a religionist meant being part of a larger group, since adherents of a particular religion could or can be found in more than one society and affiliation to that religion could or can transcend national borders.

I would like to reflect on the reciprocal relationships of religionist to citizen and citizen to religionist as they have affected Jews and Judaism in the ancient past, the near past, and the modern world. I begin with the story of a Jew of ancient times who proclaimed status as citizen protected him from harm, harm at the hands of other Jews, who were religionists, but religionists different than he. I am speaking of Paul as described in the Book of Acts. We read that when he returned to Jerusalem from Antioch and Ephesus, he came to the Temple. There he encountered a number of fellow Jews who were, to say the least, hostile to his teachings. A riot ensued; and Paul was set upon and beaten. Roman troops were called in to establish order and Paul was arrested. He was about to be flogged when he asserted his Roman citizenship, saying:

Is it legal for you to flog a Roman citizen who hasn't even been found guilty?¹

Paul's statement evokes law, Roman law. It suggests that according to that law there were two different statuses within the Roman Empire, those who were citizens and those who were not. Paul's being a citizen not only protected him from flogging by Romans but from attacks by other Jews. That Paul is presented as being under yet another system of law, Jewish law, is suggested by his appearance before the Sanhedrin, where for some, but not for others, he is declared to be guiltless. That the Sanhedrin could be ordered to appear by the senior Roman officer indicates clearly which legal system was in control. Looking at the inner logic of the report given in Acts, without dealing with the question of its historical veracity, for the Roman officer to send Paul to Caesarea, suggests that for that officer, whatever Paul did, did not contravene Roman law. Had the officer felt that it did, he would not have protected Paul nor sent him on. On the other hand, had Paul merely contravened Jewish law, but not Roman law, one might wonder whether he would have been harmed by the Romans. After all, if a Roman citizen could not be whipped without a Roman trial, what Roman law would Paul have broken? Perhaps the reason that, in the scene before the Sanhedrin, the Book of Acts describes Paul as not having contravened Jewish law is to present the writer's view that Paul was guiltless, having contravened neither system of law.

Though Paul is presented as following the laws of the Jewish community, however they might be enforced, it is clear from the report in Acts that there were Jews who thought that he had not. Again, looking at the inner logic of the report, it might be argued that had Paul followed the views of those Jews, there would have been no story and, indeed, no Christianity! One might also say that had there been no Roman law or had Paul not been a citizen, Christianity might not have emerged!

It would seem that just as the interface of citizen/religionist made possible the advent of Christianity in the ancient world, so would the interface of citizen/religionist make possible different forms of Judaism in the modern world. In both situations the power of Jewish law as law was diminished. Had Jewish law been operative in the first case, there would have been no Christianity and had Jewish law been operative in the second case, there would have been no new forms of Judaism. Being a citizen in both cases affected the operative quality of the law; affecting in one way or another, the Jew as religionist.

Modern times began for the Jews in Western Europe following those changes in ideas and society that created that complex of events we call the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The notions of the former and the actions of the latter changed the world of French Jewry and subsequently the worlds of other Jews. Jews had been in France for many years, indeed, for centuries; however, for them, the operative word was **in**; they had been **in** the country but never **of** the country; Jews in France and elsewhere throughout Europe, were a separate legal entity; separate by the law system of the surrounding society and separate by a Jewish system of law. That system had sanctions, not only in the World to Come, but also, in this world; real sanctions like fines, lashes, excommunication, and even, in some places and at some times, the death penalty. Separation by law reflected separation by community; the Jewish community was separate from the general community; the individual Jew was within the Jewish community. Hence the Jew was **in**

France (and in many another country) but not **of** France.

The logic of the French Revolution, once applied to Jews, meant that they would become, at least in theory, what the words of the Marseillaise proclaimed, *enfants de la patrie*, children **of** the country. Jews became such children due to two meetings called by Napoleon, to which some Jews were invited. The first, an Assembly of Jewish Notables occurred on 29 July 1806 and the second on 4 February 1807. The latter meeting would be later known as the Napoleonic Sanhedrin; the term which we have seen before (in the story of Paul) suggested something about putative Jewish authority.

Twelve questions were put to the notables, for our purposes, the following four are germane:

In the eyes of the Jews are the French brothers or strangers? What behavior does Jewish law prescribe toward French Christians? Do Jews born in France consider France their country? Are they willing to defend it and obey its laws? ²

The answers which the Notables gave in 1806 and which were approved by the Sanhedrin of 1807 may be summed up by the response given by one of the notables, Abraham Fortado, who had attended both meetings. He said,

We no longer form a nation within a nation. France is our country.³

If those Jews who attended both meetings agreed that "France . . . [be] our country," then their answers to those four questions easily follow: namely, that other Frenchmen were their brothers, that different religions didn't make that much of a difference, that they would obey French law, and that they would defend France.

Something else would follow "France is our country": Jews would no longer be a separate entity within France! By the logic of being part of the country, part of France, Jews became what they had never been before, citizens, citizens of France!

One of Napoleon's commissioners at the Sanhedrin, M. Portalis, summed up the epic change with the words:

[T]he Jews ceased to be a people and remained only a religion.⁴

To be part of "only a religion" was to become, what other faith communities in France already had become: voluntary associations of French citizens, who differed, at least in theory, from one another, by what they did on weekends and a few other days during the year. To be part of "only a religion" and a French citizen meant **not** to be separate by law, internal and external, but rather to be **within** the same law system **of** every other French citizen, *i.e.*, the legal system of the general society. To be a citizen meant to be part of a legal system that did not claim a divine sanction and in some cases could override systems that did. To be a citizen of France, for example, might mean going to war against citizens

of another country, even if those other citizens were fellow Jews (or fellow Catholics or fellow Protestants.)

To be part of “only a religion” reflected a new status of being a citizen. To be a citizen meant to relate to non-Jews in a different manner than before. Non-Jews were now fellow citizens! What now became important was citizenship, not religion. To be a citizen for Jews would mean to look at Christians differently than they had before and to expect that Christians would look at Jews differently than they had before. Both Jews and Christians were now fellow Frenchmen, as brothers in French society. In the distant past for Christians and in the nearer past for Jews, religion had been the marker of identity; in the new situation, being French (and later, being German or Italian or Dutch or English), would now become the marker of identity. Separate identity would remain in terms of religious identity, but such identity would be peripheral: the Jew would be a Jewish Frenchman; the Christian would be a Christian Frenchman. The important part would be the noun, not the adjective. (Or, so it seemed!)

“Only a religion” meant that Jewish law as law had come to an end, at least law with sanctions in this life, for “only a religion” cannot enforce sanctions in the face of another legal system.⁵ That lack of sanctions would make possible the kind of changes in the Judaism that then existed that would lead to the various denominations in American and European Judaism, whether Orthodox, Reform, Conservative, Liberal, Reconstructionist, or any variant thereof.

Being a citizen thus had a theological impact: a new kind of Judaism came into being, a Judaism that was “only a religion”, a religion akin to the other forms of religion in the society, a religion which consciously or unconsciously mirrored the various Christian religions in the society. No longer the decisor of Jewish law, the rabbi became a pastor and a preacher; the community became the congregation to which a Jew might choose to belong or not. “Only a religion” was a religion of and by choice!

As the name might suggest, Reform Judaism was the result of the new situation. Israel Jacobson, advisor to King Jerome of Westphalia, brother to Napoleon, erected his own place of worship in Seesen in 1810, calling the structure a ‘temple’ instead of the traditional term ‘synagogue’. (That would become the standard nomenclature for Reform synagogues!)⁶ The dedication of that temple was described as the “festival of the Jewish Reformation.” Within it, reforms of worship were carried out: changes that were forbidden by Jewish law could not have been enacted in an earlier time when the law was operative. Among such reforms were the reciting some Hebrew prayers in German, having a weekly sermon, and employing a mixed choir and an organ in worship. It should be noted that with those reforms, Jewish worship would parallel the worship pattern of other religions; it should also be noted that such a parallel is what one might expect that of “only a religion”! When Westphalia was freed from French control, pressure from its new government, which was opposed to any innovation, forced Jacobson to close down his temple. Moving to Berlin, Jacobson opened up a temple in his own home. Reform Judaism, it should be noted, was begun, not by a rabbi, but by a banker.

Rabbis would be involved with the Reform Movement as it began to develop. A temple was opened in Hamburg on 18 October 1818; two men with rabbinical training were engaged as preachers. A distinguished scholar, Abraham Geiger (1810-1874), was invited to become the preacher of the congregation in Breslau; he was opposed by the resident rabbi of the congregation, S.A. Ticktin (1791-1843). That controversy framed the development of the Reform movement and the variants that developed from it: on the one side, there were traditionalists who opposed any kind of change and on the other, some Reformers who were open to every kind of change; in between there were those who attempted to find a middle position, holding on to the tradition in general and yet accepting some change in particular. Certain names would appear: Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888), the champion of Orthodoxy, and Samuel Holdheim (1806-1875) and the aforementioned Abraham Geiger attempting to hold on to some middle position.⁷

Rabbinic conferences would be called to work out some common position, but to no avail. It may well be that the failure of the Revolutions of 1830 and of 1848 moved European society to a more traditional mode and established a form of Judaism which was both traditional and liberal, so that ‘Liberal Judaism’ in Western Europe used traditional liturgy and an organ.

Reform Judaism brought to America by immigrants from German-speaking lands soon fit into the open society of America. Jews in America had never been other than citizens. Frontiers were still open in every sense of the word. There was no experience of a Jewish community formed by internal or external law. Hence the Jews of 19th century America found Reform Judaism to be congenial, reflecting their own experience of being citizens. Being a citizen in America would have both a theological and a liturgical impact. This may be seen most clearly in theological and liturgical developments of the Reform Jewish movement in America. In 1885, meeting in Pittsburgh, a number of Reform rabbis set out the first statement of principles of that movement, what would later be called the “Pittsburgh Platform.” One is struck by how non-specific the language is, whether describing the Deity or any text held to be sacred.

The First Principle read:

We recognize in every religion an attempt to grasp the Infinite One, and in every book, source or book of revelation held sacred in any religious system the consciousness of the indwelling of God in man.⁸

Though the Principle went on to provide justification for Judaism, saying;

We hold that Judaism presents the highest conception of the Law as taught in our holy Scriptures and developed and spiritualized by the Jewish teachers in accordance with the moral and philosophical progress of their respective ages.⁹

It should be noted that while the words “book of revelation” [held sacred in any religious system], “holy Scriptures,” and “Bible,” terms used by various religionists, are mentioned, a word specific to Jews, “Torah” was not.

Though the term “book of revelation” was mentioned, one ought to reflect on the assumptions of such a term. The notion of revelation carries with it specificities: a specific revealer, a specific body of information revealed, and a specific person or group of persons to whom such revelation is given. Polemics between religious groups are based on different understandings of those specifics. Religions claiming revelation base their validity on specific revelations. One finds Religion A claiming validity on the basis of Revelation A; nowhere does one find that Religion A magnanimously grants that the adherents of Religion B may think that they have a valid revelation, but, alas, they are in error. Granted the opportunity, the adherents of Religion B would say the same about the adherents of Religion A. The claim of revelation, if taken seriously, is a zero sum game: if one side has it, the other side does not.

It is clear then, that to the writers of the Pittsburgh Platform, the term “book of revelation” could contain no content; in the context of the Platform, the phrase could only suggest that there were people who were not Jews who claimed such revelation. For the authors of the Platform to actually accept such a claim, would have been to vitiate the validity of the Judaism! In fairness to those authors, one might suppose that they thought that though there were people who made such a claim; it was not polite or politic to them or it.

The necessity to fit into society and not to “rock the boat” raises the question of how much can one fit in and not lose that which makes Jews (or Christians or Muslims) what they are. When the Platform spoke of “every religion,” it suggested that there was an affinity of Judaism, at least the Judaism of the writers of the Pittsburgh Platform, with the other religions existing side by side in the country. To speak of the “indwelling of God in man” was to suggest that all persons qua persons can have, indeed, do have God within them; it is to moot, though that might not be immediately apparent, the question of which religion came from God and which religion is thereby the “true” one.

Such “indwelling” would also moot the question of specific revelation even for Jews. Though we have noted that the word “Torah” did not appear in the Pittsburgh Platform, the term “Mosaic legislation” did. Lacking the specific revelation of the past, the Reform Jew who wrote and for whom the Platform was written, would understand something about the legislation as given in the Third Principle of the Platform:

We recognize in the Mosaic legislation a system of training the Jewish people for its mission during the national life in Palestine, and today we accept as binding only its moral laws and maintain only such ceremonials as elevate and sanctify our lives, but reject all such as are not adopted to the views and habits of modern civilization.¹⁰

If only its “moral laws” and selected “ceremonials” are acceptable, then “the Mosaic legislation” could not be the kind of binding legislation that made for specificity; and the American Jew could then fit in more easily into American society. As another means of fitting in, one more “adapted to the views and habits of modern civilization” would be that kind of liturgical change which reflected “fitting in.”

We may take as example, the treatment of the *Aleynu* prayer. Originally part of the New Year Service, since the 13th century it has become one of the concluding passage of all

daily services.¹¹ The prayer, traditionally read in Hebrew, reflects the separate status of the Jewish People, as the translation of its opening lines indicates:

It is our duty to praise the Master of all, the Creator of the universe, who has not made us like the nations of the world and has not placed us like the families of the earth; who has not designed our destiny to be like theirs, nor our lot like that of all their multitude.¹²

Not mere specificity, but the sense of being chosen, is proclaimed by this prayer. As the sense of being a citizen would affect the sense of specificity, so it would affect the liturgical reflection of that specificity. Hence, in one of the first of the Reform prayerbooks, published after the Pittsburgh conference, the *Aleynu* would not only be read in English, there would be significant changes in its text; thus, we read that,

It is our duty to render praise and thanksgiving unto the Creator of heaven and earth, who delivered us from the darkness of false belief and sent us the light of His truth. He is our God, there is none besides.¹³

Thus the difference between Jews and others is presented in intellectual terms and not in terms of divine choice or special destiny.

A still later version of the *Aleynu* prayer would remove any distinction between Jew and non-Jew:

Let us adore the ever-living God, and render praise unto Him who spread out the heavens and established the earth, whose glory is revealed in the heavens above and whose greatness is manifest throughout the world, He is our God; there is none else.¹⁴

This form of the *Aleynu* prayer would remain through a number of subsequent editions of the UPB. The old form of the *Aleynu* prayer would re-emerge when the UPB would be succeeded in 1975 by *Sha'arei Tefilah, The Gates of Prayer*, as one possible form of the prayer. The more inclusive forms of the prayer would remain as possibilities. To appreciate the liturgical change, we need to turn to the changes in the self-image of Jews, even American Jews, in the years following the Pittsburgh Platform.

Much would happen between 1885 and 1937, the time of the next statement of Reform Judaism, to affect the self-image of the Jew. Those who wrote the Pittsburgh Platform assumed that the Jews “were only a religion,” events were to prove them wrong. “Only a religion” worked as long as the individual Jew felt himself to be a citizen like unto other citizens in the country in which he resided. The endemic anti-Semitism that had existed in Eastern Europe after the First World War and the advent of National Socialism in Germany were to change how Jews in Europe and Jews in the United States viewed their Judaism. Anti-Semitism proved that somehow, being a Jew was more than being part of “only a religion”.

If we turn now to another statement of the Reform Movement, the so-called Columbus Platform of 1937, we see that ethnic identification, the sense of being part of a people, had

returned. The Columbus Platform begins noting “the changes that have occurred in the modern world.”¹⁵ Those changes find their response in the statement on “Judaism and its Foundations,” which has the words, “Judaism is the historical experience of the Jewish People.”¹⁶ That people is here called “Israel” and as we learn further:

Judaism is the soul of which Israel is the body. Living in all parts of the world, Israel has been held together by the ties of a common history, and above all, by the heritage of faith . . . [W]e maintain that it is by religion and for its religion that the Jewish people has lived.”¹⁷

Though the Columbus Platform situated Judaism within the Jewish People and claimed that the two were co-extensive, the issue of Jew as citizen still presented itself. Thus, the Platform had to assert:

In all lands where our people live, they assume and seek to share loyally the full duties and responsibilities of citizenship and create seats of Jewish knowledge and religion.¹⁸

The Columbus Platform also address the issue of Zionism, which had been anathema to early Reform Judaism:

In the rehabilitation of Palestine, the land hallowed by memories and hopes, we behold the promise of renewed life for many of our brethren. We affirm the obligation of all Jewry to aid in its upbuilding.¹⁹

So Jews are members of a particular people, linked worldwide by religion, citizens of the various countries in which they live and yet are interested in establishing a national life in another country. While this summary of the Platform may reflect the true nature of that unique entity, the Jewish People, it presented then in 1937 and now in 2005 certain tensions; tensions which in our day have been exacerbated by the blessed fact of the existence of the State of Israel. The tensions are not merely those of citizen versus religionist, they are the tensions of establishing the markers of Jewish identity: what makes a person a Jew? The Columbus Platform came out in 1937; the Holocaust was a horror yet undreamed of; however, in Germany, the Nuremberg Laws were already in place, mandating that a person would be treated as a Jew if his/her forebears had Jews as far back as the middle of the 18th century. Being a Jew was defined in “racial terms”; “only a religion” had nothing to do with it.

As we noted, the Pittsburgh Platform did not contain the word “Torah”; the Columbus Platform did. But even here, the newer platform presented a liberal approach to revelation. We learn in the section on Torah:

God reveals Himself not only in the majesty, beauty, and orderliness of nature, but also in the vision and moral striving of the human spirit. Revelation is a continuous process, confined to no one group and to no one age.²⁰

Such a notion of revelation would not provide the basis of the specificity of the Jewish group; hence, to provide such a basis, the Platform had to continue:

Yet the people Israel, through its prophets and sages, achieved unique insight in the realm of religious truth. The Torah, both written and oral, enshrines Israel’s ever-growing consciousness of God the moral law.²¹

Revelation, then, is something achieved, not something received. “Israel’s ever-growing consciousness of God and the moral law” makes it possible to reject certain of the laws of the Torah as not befitting the present age while holding on to the other notions. In a manner similar to those thinkers who wish to combine the Biblical notion of creation with evolution, whatever could be retained was felt to have some divine imprimatur, whatever was to be sloughed off would depend on the needs of an age different from the past and its needs.

In 1976, the Reform Movement came out with yet another statement of Jewish belief, called the Centenary Perspective. That statement reflected the changes which had affected the Jews as individuals and as members of a people in the years following the founding of the UAHC in 1873, the Hebrew Union College in 1875, the Holocaust, and the founding of the State of Israel. That the Perspective had an unclear vision of what constitutes Reform Judaism is suggested by its title, “Diversity within Unity, the hallmark of Reform.”²²

Though the Perspective began with the traditional three elements of Judaism, God, Israel, and Torah, defining the three presented difficulties. As for the first, God, the Perspective noted as follows:

[T]hrough the centuries . . . we have experienced and conceived of God in many ways. The trials of our own time . . . have made steady belief and unclear understanding difficult for some. Nevertheless, we ground our lives, personally and communally, on God’s reality and remain open to new experiences and conceptions of the Divine.²³

As for the second, Israel, as represented in the Jewish People and Judaism, the difficulties in definition were given an explanation:

[B]oth are in the process of becoming Jews, by birth or conversion, constitute an uncommon union of faith and peoplehood. Born as Hebrews in the ancient Near East we are bound together like all ethnic groups by language, land, history, culture and institutions. But the people of Israel is unique because of its involvement with God and its resulting perception of the human condition. Throughout its long history, our people have been inseparable from its religion with its messianic hope that humanity will be redeemed.²⁴

The aforementioned “peoplehood” is linked to the notion of God and the notion of Torah, for we learn that

Torah results from the relationship between God and the Jewish People.²⁵

“Torah” in such a setting becomes more than merely a book, the written Torah or merely

the commentary on that book, the Oral Torah, but a way of relating to the Jewish past. Thus we learn:

The records of our earliest confrontations are uniquely important to us. Lawgivers and prophets, historians and poets gave us a heritage whose study is a religious imperative and whose practice is a means to holiness.²⁶

The Centenary has moved far from the non-specificity of the Pittsburgh Platform. More than ethical behavior is asked of the Jew:

Our founders stressed that the Jew's ethical responsibilities, personal and social are enjoined by God. The past century has taught us that the claims made upon us may begin with our ethical obligations but they extend to other aspects of Jewish living . . . creating a Jewish home . . . life-long study, private prayer and public worship[,] keeping the Sabbath and the holy days . . . Reform Jews are called upon to confront the claims of Jewish Tradition.²⁷

The religion here being presented is far more demanding than the religion presented by the Pittsburgh Platform; that is not to say that the demand which the Centenary Perspective makes is based on a legal system with sanctions; it is to say that within the Reform Movement, the term *halakhah* (lit. 'the way of going'), which is the traditional term for Jewish law, is being more and more heard. Indeed, we have at every convention of the Reform Rabbinate, a meeting of the Freehof Institute of Reform Halachah, where papers on Jewish law, as a means of gaining insight on present problems, are presented.

If now Reform Jews are talking about law, they are not talking about controlling behavior by here-and-now sanctions, sanctions which would interfere with the role as citizen; they are talking about a concern about group behavior as a means of self-perpetuation; how that concern relates to the notion of autonomy, the banner of Reform Judaism, is an ongoing problem. To talk about group behavior, what is acceptable and what is not, is to talk about group expectations as a means of forming the future of the group; such talk is to affirm that Jews, even liberal or Reform Jews, are part of a people. To talk of people among others is to talk consciously or not about some kind of separate entity, it is to talk about some kind of separation from other people within a polity. It is to think of being a citizen differently than the way Jews thought of being a citizen at the time of the French Revolution. Perhaps the notion that citizenship covered over differences was too optimistic a notion. Perhaps specific history or specific geography have gotten in the way; history in terms of the Holocaust and geography in terms of the existence of the State of Israel. Perhaps, and now I speak as an American, the joining of religion to politics, which though it might have existed a hundred years ago, was not something which was present to consciousness in my life or the lives of other Jews of my age or younger, has made worry about the issue of citizenship and religion. Perhaps, that is precisely because it is not my religion that is making demands on the society.

A modern issue of citizen versus religionist was being played out in the Land of Israel with regard to the proposed evacuation of Gaza. Those who opposed such an evacuation did so,

they said, on religious grounds. They believe that God has given every inch of the Land of Israel to the Jewish People and therefore to give up any of it goes against the Divine Will. More than that: they believe that no Jew may assist in the process of evacuation, as they put the following telling plaint on their banners: "A Jew does not deport another Jew".

It may be interesting to note that the objectors in Gaza are supported by other religionists, who, however, are not Jews, but who also have a 'religious' reason for wishing that Jews remain everywhere in the Land of Israel, although it be for other 'religious' reasons. These religionists who are Christians and Protestants call themselves Christian Zionists. They too object to the decision of the government of Israel to unilaterally disengage from Gaza. One of them described those military forces who will aid in the implantation of the disengagement, *i.e.*, the Army and the Border Guard as "5,000 Druze, Bedouin, and Jewish jerks raised in a non-faithful environment." Thus we have a Christian religionist commenting adversely on the religious background of Jews. A most interesting statement!

The conflict between the requirements of being a citizen and that of being a religionist has its positive and negative outcomes for Jews. Being a citizen meant being open to the world in a way that being religionist (at the time) could not be. Being a citizen meant that Judaism became "only a religion", *i.e.*, a voluntary association. Judaism as "only a religion" might be that which could be changed to meet the new situation of citizenship or something that could be jettisoned or exchanged for another religion.

The conflict between the Jew as religionist was more theoretical than real; history did not allow the Jew to be merely a member of "only a religion". Being a citizen equal to other citizens did not occur for Jews in many a country, whatever the reigning theory of the society. That being the case, Jews regarded themselves and were regarded by others as members of a discrete group, whether or not Jewish religion provided the markers for that group feeling.

That group feeling was one of the motivations for the Zionist movement and the ultimate creation of the State of Israel. Yet even there, the pragmatic assumptions that might move some Israelis as citizens come into conflict with the values which move some Israelis as religionists. To be a citizen is to be concerned with the needs of a here and now society; to be a religionist, of whatever persuasion, is to be concerned as well with needs and requirements beyond the here and now. To be a citizen is to look to society for values and validation; to be a religionist is to look as well to ultimate value and, for some, other-worldly validation. For all persons, there is a tension between being a citizen and being a religionist; for Jews, even more so.

¹ Acts 20:25.

² Sachar, Howard M., *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland & New York, 1958, p. 60. Henceforth cited in this manner, MJP, p. 60.

³ MJP, p. 63.

⁴ MJP, p. 63.

⁵ Cf. the magisterial work *Jewish Law: History, Sources, Principles*, Elon, Menachem, Translated from the Hebrew by Bernard Auerbach and Melvin Sykes, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia and Jerusalem, 1994, Vol IV, "The Period of Emancipation," pp. 1576-1584.

⁶ Cf. Article, "Reform Judaism" in *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York, 1905, Vol. X, pp. 353, 354; *The History of The Jews*, by Graetz, H., Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1949, Vol. V, pp. 500, 501.

⁷ For a discussion of the extremes and the attempt to find a middle position, see *A History of the Jews*, Grayzel, Solomon, Jewish Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1965, pp. 596-589.

⁸ Glazer, Nathan, *American Judaism*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957, p. 151. Henceforth cited in this manner: AJ, p. 151.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Cf. Idelsohn, Z.Z., *Jewish Liturgy and its Development*, Schocken Books, New York, 1967, p. 116; Hertz, J.H., *The Authorized Daily Prayer Book*, Bloch Publishing Company, 1985, pp. 208, 209; Birnbaum, Philip, *Daily Prayer Book*, Hebrew Publishing Company, 1949, pp. 135, 36.

¹² Birnbaum, Philip, *Daily Payer Book*, p. 136.

¹³ *Union Prayer Book*, Adopted by the Central Conference of American Rabbis, Bloch Publishing Co, Chicago, 1892, p. 17.

¹⁴ *Union Prayer Book*, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Cincinnati, 1922, p. 32.

¹⁵ "Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism, Adopted by the Central Conference of American Rabbis at Columbus, Ohio, 27 May 1937. Introduction. Henceforth cited as Columbus Platform, Intro.

¹⁶ Columbus Platform, Article One.

¹⁷ Columbus Platform, Article Five.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Columbus Platform, Article Four.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² "Reform Judaism: A Centenary Perspective," Adopted June, 1976. Central Conference of American Rabbis, 790 Madison Avenue, New York, NY, p. 2. Henceforth cited as Perspective, p. 2.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Perspective, p. 2, Article II.

²⁵ Perspective, p. 2, Article III.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Perspective, p. 3, Article IV.